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THE LAW OF WILLS
By

JoH"

C.

ALBERT. OF THE MILWAUKEE BAR.

A will in general is the disposition of property, to take effect
on or after the death of the owner, 4o Cyc. 995, or as defined by
Gardner on Wills, "The expression, in the manner required by
law, and operative for no purpose until death, of that which one
may lawfully require to be done after his death."
A last will and testament is the disposition of one's property,
to take effect after death.
I. Redf. Wills, 5.
When a will operates upon personal property, it is sometimes
called a "testament" and when upon land a "will", but the general and popular denomination is that of last will and testament,
and so today the terms will and testament are used synonymously.
The term "will" also is construed as including a codicil.
Wis. Statutes, Section 4971-18.
Wills were recognized by the Hebrew, Greek and Roman law,
and also under the early English law.
That wills existed and were recognized at an early date, (and
one of the oldest wills) we have but to turn to Gen. c. 48, v. 22,
when Jacob said to Joseph, "I have given to thee one portion
above thy brother."
Under the early English law or common law, wills as to personalty were valid, also as to lands, until the introduction of the
feudal system, when lands could not be devised. To overcome
the hardship caused by the feudal system, Statute 32, Henry VIII,
Chapter i (the original Statute of Wills), was passed, which
made possible the devising of all lands, except one-third of lands
held under military tenure. While under the Statute 27, Henry
VIII, Chapter Io, profits of land could be devised, yet the land
itself could not, until the passage of Statute 32, Henry VIII,
Chapter i.
From the time of the passage of Statute 32, Henry VIII,
Chapter I, to Charles I, (1645), there was practically no change
on the law of wills, but since Charles I, the Statutes of England
have been changed by imperceptible degrees until July 3, 1837,
when i Vict., Chapter 26, was enacted and which went into effect
January1, 1838, which provided that a person could dispose of
by will the whole of his goods and chattels and lands which he
shall be entitled to either at law or in equity, at the time of his
death.
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The right to dispose of one's property, both real and personal,
by will has always existed in the United States.
i Redf. Wills, page 3, subd. 5.

The right to make a will, not being an inherent right, and
not guaranteed by any fundamental law, is in most jurisdictions
regulated by statute, and so in Wisconsin the same is regulated
by statute.
Sections 2277 and 2281 of the Wisconsin Statutes provide that
every person of full age, and any married woman of the age of
I8 years and upwards, being of sound mind, may make a will
disposing of real and personal property.
Prior to June 24 th, 1677, under the common law of England,
which includes the statutes up to that time, a will of personal
property might be either verbal or written, and, if written, yet
it was unnecessary that it should be signed or witnessed in order
to be valid.
i Redf. Wills, 170-176.
Brunn vs. Schuett, 59 Wis. 262.
The abuses which arose in the attempts to set aside written
wills, by proving verbal or nuncupative wills, was finally culminated in Coles vs. Mordaunt, where it appeared at the bar of
the King's Bench, that most of the nine witnesses against the
will were guilty of deliberate perjury, and that the widow who
sought to set aside the will was guilty of subornation of perjury.
This case brought about a great and lasting reform in the law
of wills, by the enactment of the Statute 29, Car. II, the original
Statute of Frauds.
it re Ladd's Will, 6o Wis. 189.
Under the Statute 29, Car. II, all statutes prior to June 24,
1677, giving the right to make nuncupative wills were so far
repealed and amended that all verbal and nuncupative wills, even
as to personal property, were made invalid in England except as
therein provided.
As to nuncupative wills see Sections 2292 and 2293 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which is a substantial re-enactment of Sections
19 and 2o of the Act of 29, Car. IH.
The first essential element necessary to the making of a valid
will is that of testamentary capacity, which is, that the testator
must be of sound mind, legally competent and not under any
legal disability.
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The testamentary capacity of the testator is governed as to
personal property by the law of the domicile of the testator, and
as to real property by the law where the realty is situated; and
must exist at the time of the execution of the will. It is not sufficient, if the testator was competent at the time the will was dictated, or drawn, or subsequent to the execution, or if power to
execute was created by subsequent legislative enactment.
As a general rule a person under some legal disability to contract, likewise has no testamentary capacity to make a valid will,
as infants (except married women of the age of 18 years and
upwards) and insane persons, but a will made by a person during
sanity will not be revoked by the subsequent insanity of the testator. So also partial insanity or insane delusions, will not defeat
a will unless such insanity or delusion directly influenced the provisions of the will. A will made during a lucid interval is also
valid.
Chaffin Will Case, 32 Wis. 557.
Will of Cole, 49 Wis. I79.
Will of Silverthorn, 68 Wis. 372.
Spiritualism is not insane delusion.
Will of J. B. Smith, 52 Wis. 543.
Under the common law, aliens could not devise real estate,
but could bequeath personal property, unless they were at the
time alien enemies, then they could not.
Section 2200 of the Wisconsin Statutes gives an alien the right
to hold and devise realty, and that in case he should die intestate
the same shall descend the same as if such alien were a native
citizen of the state or of the United States.
See also Wisconsin Constitution, Section 15, Article I, which
provides that "no distinction shall ever be made by law between
resident aliens and citizens in reference to the possession, enjoyment, or descent of property." And Id. Section 14, Article I,
provides that, "all lands within the state are declared to be
allodial, and feudal tenures are prohibited."
Criminals under the common law could not make a will, but
the freeholds of inheritance which at the time of the death
belonged to a man who died a delo de se escheated to the crown.
But this rule was finally changed so as to become obsolete except
as to treason and felonies.
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Constitution U. S., Section IO, Article i, declares that, "no

state shall * * * pass any bill of attainter or ex post facto law."
And Id. Section 3, Article 3, "but no attainter shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate," but gives congress the
power to punish for treason. So the Wisconsin Constitution
declares that no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
From the above it will be seen that a person does not lose his
property or forfeit his estate by being convicted of a crime, except
when congress may prescribe a law punishing treason by forfeiture of his estate for life.
So also under the common law a married woman, unless
acting under a power of appointment, could not make a valid will
as to her real or personal property, without her husband's consent, but today under statute in most all jurisdictions a married
woman can dispose of her property, both real and personal, by
will, the same as if she were a feme sole.
Section 2342 of the Wisconsin Statutes gives a married
woman the right to receive and hold for her sole and separate
use, and to convey and devise real and personal property, or any
interest therein.
The law as to whether a drunkard can make a valid will seems
to be pretty well settled that he can, as drunkenness is merely
evidence of insanity, but not conclusive. As stated in Cyc. Vol.
40, pages 1017 and ioi8: "If one knows what he is about he

may make a will, although intoxicated at the time of the execution or of intemperate habits to such an extent as to have become
a habitual drunkard, or judicially declared a drunkard; and this
is so even though his mind was so weakened by intoxicants that
he could not take care of his estate, but one does not possess
testamentary capacity where he is suffering from chronic alcoholic
insanity or where the will is made when deprived of judgment
and reason from the use of intoxicants. One who is frequently
intoxicated may still have testamentary capacity when sober, and
capacity at the time of the execution of the will is the point in
issue."
Extreme old age will not of itself prevent the making of a

valid will, unless the testator is so enfeebled mentally as to not
understand what he is doing, as when he is suffering from hallucinations, paralysis or softening of the brain, but a mere failing
of memory is not sufficient, especially where the will is fairly
made and apparently emanating from free will.
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Cyc. Vol. 40, page Ioo8.
In re Will of Mullan, 14o Wis. 291, where the testatrix's
faculties were somewhat impaired by age, the court held that
testatrix, having sufficient mental power to call to mind the particulars of her business and hold them in mind for such a time
so as to perceive their obvious relations, and to form a rational
judgment in respect to them, was competent to make a will.
Field vs. Pichard,x26 Wis. 229.
In re Bowmantn's Will, 133 Wis. 494.
Gavitt vs. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35.
A will executed by a person under some legal disability will
not become valid upon removal of the disability, unless the will
is republished.
MENTAL CAPACITY.
When has a person sufficient mental capacity to make a valid
will?
In re Butler's Will, Nio Wis. 7o , at page 78, the court said:
"The test is not whether the testator did the best or the wisest
or the theoretically just thing in his will; but, did he have sufficient active memory to collect in his mind and comprehend, withoft prompting, the condition of his property, his relations to his
children and other persons who might properly be his beneficiaries, and the scope and bearing of his will, and to hold these
things in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive their
obvious relations to each other, and be able to form some rational
judgment in relation to them." Also citing In re Lewis" Will,
51 Wis. IOi.
The testator having mental capacity, wl.at are the requisites
necessary to the execution of a valid will?
F'irst of all, a will being a creature of the statute, the statute
must be strictly followed. Section 2282 of the Wisconsin Statute
provides that no will made within this state since the first day of
January, 1896, shall be effectual to pass any estate, whether real
or personal, or to charge or in any way affect the same unless it
be in writing and signed by the testator or by some person in
his presence and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two or more competent
witnesses in the presence of each other; if the witnesses are competent at the time of such attesting their subsequent incompe-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

tency, from whatever cause it may arise, shall not prevent the
probate and allowance of the will if it be otherwise satisfactorily
proved.
Secondly, the testator must not be under any undue influence,
but must have the free use of his mind and will power.
The wording of the statue being self-explanatory, will discuss only that which requires the will to be "attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two or more competent
witnesses."
What is in the presence of the testator, and when is it in his
presence, is more or less a question of fact in each particular
instance.
In re Dozumie's Will, 42 Wis. 66, the will was witnessed in
an adjoining room, and out of the testator's vision, and then
shown to testator, who assented and approved of same. The court
held that this was not in the testator's presence, as the testator
was not in a position (not being blind) to see the witnesses sign
if he so desired.
In re Will of John Meurer, 54 Wis. 392, the will was witnessed in a room adjoining testator's bedroom, the door leading
to said adjoining room being open, and the table in the adjoining
room was so situated that the testator, sitting in his bed, could
see the table and the persons sitting at the table. The court held
that the fact that the witnesses signed in an adjoining room, and
not in the room where the testator was, was wholly immaterial
as it appeared that it was done in his view. In other words, if
the testator be in a position where, by the mere act of volition,
and without materially changing his position, he can witness the
attestation, it is sufficient.
From the above cases, in Wisconsin today a will is executed
in the testator's presence, if the testator be in such a position, that
if he so desires (not being blind) that he could have seen by
attempting to see without materially changing his position, the
witnesses sign. That is, the signing must have been in his unobstructed vision.
In the case the testator should be prevented from actually
seeing the act of subscription of the witnesses by a physical
infirmity, such as blindness or an injury which prevents him from
looking in the direction of the witnesses, the signing is in his
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presence, when he is aware of it through his other senses, such
as hearing, and is done in such close proximity to him that he
could see but for the physical infirmity.

Cyc. Vol. 40, page 1124UNDUE INFLUENCE.
In re Jackman's Will, 26 Wis. 1O4, the court in defining undue
influence, and quoting from Davis vs. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 270, 302,
said, "undue influence, legally speaking, must be such as in some
measure destroys the free agency of the testator; it must be
sufficient to prevent the exercise of that discretion which the law
requires in relation to every testamentary disposition. It is not
enough that the testator be dissuaded, by solicitations, or argument, from disposing of his property as he had previously
intended; he may yield to the persuasions of affection or attachment, and allow their sway to be exerted over his mind; and in
neither of these cases would the law regard the influence as
undue. To amount to this, it must be equivalent to moral coercion; it must constrain its subject to do what is against his will,
but which, from fear, the desire of peace, or some other feeling,
he is unable to resist; and when this is so, the act which is the
result of that influence, is vitiated," or "that undue influence in
such a case is such an influence that the instrument is not properly an expression of the will of the testator in regard to the disposition of his property, but rather an expression of the will of
another person."
In re Loennecker's Will, 112 Wis. 461, it was held that inequal
distribution, or favoring one child does not of itself raise a presumption of undue influence, even though the parents he living
with the favored child. That in order to raise that presumption
the evidence must clearly show that the testator was susceptible
to undue influence and that there was opportunity and a disposition on the part of the beneficiary to exert it.
In Elliott vs. Fisk, 162 Wis. 249, the four elements necessary
to justify the setting aside of a will on the ground of undue
influence are mentioned, namely, there must be clear and satisfactory evidence establishing the susceptibility of the testator to
such influence, an opportunity for the exercise thereof, a disposition to exercise it, and a result indicating its exercise.
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While there are numerous other cases that might be referred
to, the cases mentioned sufficiently state the law on the subject,
and in summing up the same, I conclude, that in order to set aside
a will on the ground of undue influence, the influence must be
such so as to destroy the free will power of the testator and prevent him from expressing his wish and desire as to what is to
be done with his property after his death; but being a disposition
of testator's property by the person exerting the influence, the
testator must be susceptible to said influence, there must have
been an opportunity to exert it, and the testator must have acted
as a result of such influence.
REVOCATION.
How may a will be revoked?
Section 2290 of the Wi.consin Statutes practically answers
the question, which provides that no will or any part thereof shall
be revoked unless by burning, tearing, canceling or obliterating
the same, with the intention of revoking it, by the testator or by
some person in his presence and by his direction, or by some other
will or codicil in writing, * * * or by some other writing, signed,
attested and subscribed in the manner provided for the execution
of a will; excepting that nothing contained in said section shall
prevent a revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in
the condition or circumstances of the testator.
The statute being very specific, will merely by way of illustration cite the following cases.
In re Ladd's Will, 6o Wis. 187, the testatrix wrote on the
fourth sheet of her will, "I revoke this will," with her signature
and the date, but the writing was not attested or subscribed by
witnesses. The court held that this was not a revocation within
the meaning of the stp/tute even though the same was made with
intention to revoke.
In White vs. Casten, i Jones Law, 197, which is one of the
cases reviewed in the Ladd case, the paper upon which the will
was written was burned through in three places, one of them
being in the midst of the writing and a large part was scorched,
but the writing was not interfered with when it was rescued
against the testator's wish, and preserved against his knowledge,
it was held to be a revocation, but that the mere act of burning,
tearing, canceling or obliterating the will itself, without intention to revoke is not enough.
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In Deck vs. Deck, 106 'Wis. 47o, the court held that the only
way in which a will can be revoked is by complying with Section
229o, and that the mere expression on the part of the testator
to change his will was not a revocation.
As to a revocation of a will implied by law from subsequent
changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator, the
same is governed by the rules of the common law, except so far
as the same has been changed by statute or decision.
Under the common law the marriage of a feme sole revoked
a will made by her before marriage, but as to a male person, marriage alone was not sufficient, but marriage with birth of issue
was necessary to revoke a will made before marriage.
The common law rule as to a feme sole has been abrogated in
Wisconsin. The law today being that in order to work a revocation of a will made before marriage, both as to male and female,
there must be marriage and birth of issue.
In re Will of Lyon, 96 Wis. 339.
In Glascott vs. Bragg, iii Wis. 6o5, the court held that marriage and adoption of a child will revoke a wil made before marriage.
In re Will of Ballis, I43 Wis. 234, it was held that divorce
alone was not sufficient to revoke a will made during coveture,
but stated, quoting from a Michigan case, "a divorce and settlement of their property rights between husband and wife operates
ipso facto to revoke his will previously made."
In re Will of Fischer,4 Wis. 254, it was held that the making
of a subsequent will, will, if inconsistent with a former will,
revoke the former, even though such former will be only inconsistent in part and contains no revocation clause; but if both wills
can be considered as one and dispose of testator's property without conflicting, both are valid.
REVIVAL OF WILL.
In re Noon's Will, 115 Wis. 299, the court laid down the rule
that a will once revoked is forever revoked, and that the destroying of a second will, will not revive the first. That to revive such
former or first will it must be either re-executed or re-adopted
by a subsequent writing in accordance with the statute, and that
the re-filing of same with the county judge will not revive same
after it had once.been revoked.

